Autonomous vehicles are cost-effective when used as taxis by Freedman, Isaac G et al.
ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION Open Access
Autonomous vehicles are cost-effective
when used as taxis
Isaac G. Freedman1,2*, Ellen Kim2,3 and Peter A. Muennig2
Abstract
Background: Autonomous vehicles (AVs) will radically re-shape the health and well-being of people in the United
States in good ways and bad. We set out to estimate a reasonable time-to-adoption using cost-effectivenessmodels
to estimate the point at which AVs become reasonably safe and affordable for widespread adoption.
Methods: We used Waymo data (previously, Google Self-Driving Car Project) and a microsimulation model to
explore projected costs and safety issues today and five years from today to get a sense of the speed of consumer
adoption were AVs brought to the market.
Results: The adoption of AVs for private use was associated with an ICER of 1,396,110/QALY gained today, a figure
that would decline to 173,890/QALY gained 5-years in the future. However, AV taxis are both less expensive and
potentially already safer than human-piloted taxis.
Conclusions: While AVs are not unlikely to be used a family vehicles any time soon, it would make economic sense
to adopt them as taxis today. Legislation enhancing the benefits while mitigating the potential harmful health
impacts of AV taxis is needed with some urgency.
Background
Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) are presently on the road
with no human behind the wheel in some localities
(Energy and Commerce Committee 2017; U.S. Depart-
ment of Transportation 2016; State of California Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles 2018). These “level 4” vehicles are
confined to certain conditions and roads, but could plaus-
ibly be introduced more broadly in the coming year. The
Self Drive Act (HR3388) is designed to override and unify
state regulations, with the ultimate goal of expediting the
transition to a future without human piloted vehicles
(HPVs). Federal lawmakers so far are nearly exclusively fo-
cused on short-term issues, such as safety, licensing, and in-
surance issues (Energy and Commerce Committee 2017).
However, the potential benefits and harms of AVs
extend beyond their immediate safety on the road or
reduced insurance costs. AVs have the potential to trans-
form our lives in ways unseen since the introduction of
automobiles themselves well over 100 years ago.
Without policies to foster their benefits and mitigate
their harms, it is at least conceivable that society could
end up with a public health threat equal in magnitude to
the one posed by the introduction of private cars over a
century ago. At that time, policymakers did not foresee
the automobile as a leading cause of death globally. Rather,
they focused on licensure and ownership, overlooking its
potential impact on injuries, fatalities, a sedentary lifestyle,
obesity, and air pollution (McGinnis and Foege 1993).
While some level 4 AVs have been mixed with HPVs,
they are not presently on the market for sale (Kang
2017). We undertook this analysis because cohesive,
well-informed legislation is needed that considers both
the short-term public health benefits and the longer-
term social consequences of AVs (Business Insider
Insider Reports 2015; KPMG 2013). The longer-term
consequences will require time to study and regulate.
We do not evaluate these potential long-term challenges.
Rather, in this study, we simply ask whether it is
plausible that AVs are affordable and safe in their
current state today and five years from today. If AVs are
presently unaffordable or are dangerous, they are
unlikely to be widely adopted by consumers irrespective
of whether laws permit their use. Under these
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circumstances, governments may debate and study the
unintended consequences of introducing driverless cars
on our roads. As the technology improves and becomes
cheaper, laws can be gradually put into place that
mitigate the harms of AVs while nurturing their benefits.
However, if AVs are currently both affordable and
reasonably safe relative to conventional HPVs, the
government should rapidly make large investments in
understanding the benefits and threats posed by AVs.
The urgency arises from two competing problems that
arise when this new, affordable, and safer technology is
available. Either: 1) society will fail to deploy AV tech-
nology with the potential to save lives in the short-term,
leading to needless suffering and loss of life; or, 2) AVs
will be successfully introduced on the road over broader
geographic areas and will continue to grow in use with
little regulation, leading to potentially serious long-term
health and social consequences.
In this study, we simulate the economic costs and
health benefits of AVs today given their high costs as
well as the considerable uncertainty surrounding their
safety. We simply ask whether AVs are affordable and
plausibly safe given the best available data. We also
make projections of future costs.
Methods
Analytic overview
While AVs frequently hand control over to a human
driver and perform poorly in bad weather (known as dis-
engagement) (State of California 2015; Favaro et al.
2018), there is now sufficient data to estimate crash rates
were no driver present when software is optimized for a
given city.
Waymo (previously, Google Self-Driving Car Project)
uses a wider array of expensive technology to improve
its safety than other commercial AVs, and Waymo’s
vehicles have logged over 2 million miles, with billions
of simulated miles (Waymo 2017). These data allow for
microsimulation modeling of future crashes, costs, and
health effects. We further consider multiple alternative
scenarios of the unintended consequences of AVs.
We conducted a model-based analysis that closely
modeled the publicly-reported results from Waymo
since December 2016, the last point at which publicly-
available data were posted online (Waymo 2016b). The
dataset included a list of 14 crashes that took place be-
tween 1 October 2012 and 22 August 2016 while com-
pleting 2,102,047 miles of fully autonomous travel.
While the car was on fully-autonomous mode for all
crashes used in our analysis, an engineer was in the car
at all times. The average speed of the AV during colli-
sions was 0.23 miles per hour and the average speed of
the other vehicle in collisions was 7.54 miles per hour,
with the majority of crashes (9 of 14, 64%) being rear-
end collisions with the AV stationary. We used a Markov
chain microsimulation model that compares AVs and
HPVs over the average lifespan of a car. All future costs
and QALYs were discounted at a rate of 3%, and we ad-
hered to the reference case scenario of the new Panel on
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis for Health and Medicine
(Neumann et al. 2016). Our chief assumptions are listed
in Table 1.
Using a representative cohort of drivers with ages
reflecting the ages of US drivers, we calculated the incre-
mental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) of AVs as they
exist today relative to HPVs, while also projecting vari-
ous future expected and possibly unintended conse-
quences of adopting AVs. Specifically, we estimated the
incremental change in cost divided by the incremental
change in QALYs of AVs relative to that of HPVs, ac-
counting for the differential in QALYs accrued when in-
jured or dead, and various costs.
Table 1 Major assumptions and their justifications used to build our Markov microsimulation models
Assumption Justification
Driverless autonomous vehicles (AVs) will have a higher
minor crash rate than human piloted vehicles
Minor crash rates of human-piloted vehicles are very difficult to estimate as most go unreported.
Simulations from Waymo show lower crash rates, but the company has a financial stake in such
outcomes. Reported minor crash rates for Waymo showed higher rates in AVs as compared to
HPVs. The Waymo dataset is a key data source for this study.
2 million miles of driving is adequate for inference
regarding the safety of AVs
We used established formulas to extrapolate probabilities of injury and death
using observed mean crash speeds for AVs.
If adopted today, AVs would eliminate most
parking spaces
AVs can be rented as taxis by private car owners when not being used.
The cost of autonomous vehicles will decline
following Moore’s law
The efficiency and cost of many technologies follows Moore’s law for central
processing unit speeds.
Used cars will have a similar market, whether
human piloted or autonomous
While technologies in AV have few moving parts, they tend to decline in value as fast
as automobiles do because the technology becomes dated very quickly.
Autonomous vehicles without a human driver
will increase productivity
When the driver’s seat can hold a paying passenger, the additional passenger will
sometimes perform work on a device (e.g., emailing colleagues).
AVs and human-piloted vehicles are of similar
quality of build
The build of a car can also influence the probability of injury and death. In current use,
AV equipment seems to be used across a span of makes and models.
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Costs
We calculated the total costs of property damage only,
minor, and severe injury crashes as classified by the
Maximum Abbreviated Injury Scale (MAIS) score, and
death using data obtained from the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) report on the
economic and societal impact of motor vehicle crashes
(Blincoe et al. 2015). We considered a MAIS score of
less than 3 to be a minor injury crash and a MAIS score
of 3 or above to be a severe injury crash. These HPV
crash costs were then scaled to more accurately reflect
AV crashes since AV equipment is more expensive
(Greenblatt and Saxena 2015; Vallet 2016). The scaling
of costs was achieved by estimating the proportion of
costs attributable to destruction of a vehicle (car dam-
age) and adding the expected marginal cost of damage
to an AV relative to a HPV in a similar crash type (see
Additional file 1: Equation 2). We estimated the average
costs of a HPV (New-car transaction prices up 2 percent
in march 2016, along with increases in incentive spend,
according to Kelley blue book [press release] 2016), an
AV (Greenblatt and Saxena 2015), an AV projected five
years into the future under the assumption that the cost
of technology follows Moore’s law—i.e., periodic
halving—with a period of 2 years (Greenblatt and Saxena
2015; Strawn and Strawn 2015), the annual cost of
owning a car (American Automobile Association 2014),
average cost of a funeral (National Funeral Directors
Association 2017), productivity loss (i.e. opportunity
cost) from driving (United States Office of Personnel
Management n.d.; American Automobile Association
2015; Proctor et al. 2016), costs of spots (The Econo-
mist 2017; Chester et al. 2010), and taxi-related costs
(Greenblatt and Saxena 2015; New-car transaction
prices up 2 percent in march 2016, along with in-
creases in incentive spend, according to Kelley blue
book [press release] 2016; Bureau of Labor Statistics
2015; New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission
2014) using various other sources and assuming na-
tional averages. Productivity loss from driving a HPV
was calculated by multiplying the mean wage (United
States Office of Personnel Management n.d.; Proctor
et al. 2016), mean commuting time (American Auto-
mobile Association 2015), and a productivity param-
eter between 0 and 1, with a base case productivity
parameter of 0.3 Cost of parking spots for non-taxis
were calculated by multiplying the average cost of one
parking spot (including costs to build, buy the land,
maintain the spot, etc.) (The Economist 2017) by the
ratio of parking spots to registered cars (base case
ratio of 3.4) (Chester et al. 2010). The cost of parking
spots for taxis were set equal to just the average cost
one parking spot (The Economist 2017). Taxi-related
costs included costs for buying and maintaining the
vehicle, as well as salaries for drivers. We assumed
that increased parking availability, as a result of taxi
usage, would reduce fuel costs and offset the
additional fuel costs from using vehicles as taxis. See
Additional file 1 for more notes on cost of taxis. All
parameters used in estimation were included in sensi-
tivity analyses. All costs were inflated to 2016 US
dollars and are shown in Table 2.
Probability of crash, injury, and death
Expected annual probabilities of injuries and fatalities in
HPVs were calculated via NHTSA reports (Blincoe et al.
2015; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
2016). We use data from 2,102,047 autonomous vehicle
miles travelled (VMT) collected between 2010 and 2016
from Waymo – a period over which there were 14
crashes (Waymo 2016b). In all cases, the driver of the
non-AV was at fault. While all Waymo crashes are
reported, many HPV crashes are not. When only
reported crashes are considered, AVs are 1.30 times
more likely to be involved in a minor crash (Table 2).
Waymo’s AVs are tested with a human behind the
wheel who can take over if needed. Waymo’s simulations
predict that there would have been an additional 7
crashes between 2010 and 2016 were the human not
able to take control of the car, and that all 7, or 1/3,
would have been caused by the AV. Given the small n of
21 crashes, we chose not to use actual crashes to esti-
mate injuries and fatalities. Rather, we used well-
established formulas that outline the risk of crashes,
injuries, and fatalities based on mean change in vehicle
speeds at the time of the crash (Mohit et al. 2017;
Flannagan 2013), whether caused by the AV or the
human driver of the other car. Using the variance of the
actual distribution of speeds at the time of crash, we
created a distribution of speeds at the time of the crash,
and linked each sample of this distribution to its risk of
injury or death.
The mean change in speed (ΔV) for Waymo crashes
was 3.91 miles per hour. This injury model classified
injuries using the KABCO scale in which an individual is
either killed (K), has an incapacitating injury (A), a non-
incapacitating injury (B), a possible injury (C), or no
injury (O). In order to use data reported in both MAIS
and KABCO format, we considered the two scales
equivalent, with K corresponding to MAIS 6, A corre-
sponding to MAIS 3, 4, or 5, B corresponding to MAIS
1 or 2, and C corresponding to MAIS 0 or no injury.
Morbidity
Changes in health-related quality of life due to MVCs
were derived using the EuroQol 5D5L with the assist-
ance of two pediatric orthopedic surgeons with extensive
Freedman et al. Injury Epidemiology  (2018) 5:24 Page 3 of 8
clinical experience working with crash victims (Muennig
et al. 2014; Gold et al. 1996).
Decision-analysis models
We simulated the average lifespan of a motor vehicle
with an average of 14,133 annual VMT per licensed
driver (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
2016). A decision-analysis model was constructed using
TreeAgePro 2016 software for the Macintosh computer
(TreeAge Software, Willamstown, Mass.). The model ex-
amined the use of a mode of transportation for the life-
span of a HPV compared to the use of an alternative
mode of transportation for the same time period.
Following is a description of the baseline HPV versus
AV model. For each iteration (N = 10,000) of the deci-
sion analysis model, two drivers were simulated, each
with the same age randomly selected from a representa-
tive distribution of licensed drivers’ ages in the United
Table 2 Selected costs and probabilities used in the Markov microsimulation model
Low Value Base Value High Value
Selected Costs ($)a
Property Damage Only Crash (Blincoe et al. 2015) 2976 4251 5526
Minor Injury Crash (Blincoe et al. 2015) 3129 12,282 61,352
Severe Injury Crash (Blincoe et al. 2015) 200,241 274,553 1,101,865
Fatal Crash (Blincoe et al. 2015) 1,072,412 1,532,018 1,991,623
Property Damage Only Crash AV (Blincoe et al. 2015; Greenblatt and Saxena 2015; Vallet 2016) 3123 4461 5799
Minor Injury Crash AV (Blincoe et al. 2015; Greenblatt and Saxena 2015; Vallet 2016) 3864 13,332 62,717
Severe Injury Crash AV (Blincoe et al. 2015; Greenblatt and Saxena 2015; Vallet 2016) 214,206 294,503 1,127,800
Fatal Crash AV (Blincoe et al. 2015; Greenblatt and Saxena 2015; Vallet 2016) 1,086,965 1,552,808 2,018,650
Autonomous Vehicle (Greenblatt and Saxena 2015) 122,218 183,666 265,648
Autonomous Vehicle in 5 Years (Greenblatt and Saxena 2015; Strawn and Strawn 2015) 33,229 56,539 100,383
Human Piloted Vehicle (New-car transaction prices up 2 percent in march 2016, along with increases
in incentive spend, according to Kelley blue book [press release] 2016)
17,218 33,666 70,648
Annual Cost of Owning Car (American Automobile Association 2014) 8536
Funeral (National Funeral Directors Association 2017) 6206 7332 8687
Productivity (United States Office of Personnel Management n.d.; American Automobile Association 2015;
Proctor et al. 2016)
552 1657 2762
Parking spot for non-taxi (The Economist 2017; Chester et al. 2010) 47,600 102,000 176,800
Parking spot for taxi (The Economist 2017; Chester et al. 2010) 0 30,000 80,000
Taxi Salary (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2015) 19,432 27,760 36,088
Cost of Taxi (New-car transaction prices up 2 percent in march 2016, along with increases in incentive spend,
according to Kelley blue book [press release] 2016; New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission 2014)
92,699 132,427 172,155
Cost of AV Taxi (Greenblatt and Saxena 2015; New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission 2014) 197,699 282,427 367,155
Selected Probabilities
Human Piloted Vehicle (Blincoe et al. 2015; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 2016)
Crash – 0.0646 –
Property Damage Only Crash – 0.6091 –
Minor Injury from Crash – 0.3766 –
Severe Injury from Crash – 0.0090 –
Death from Crash – 0.0054 –
Autonomous Vehicle (Waymo 2016b)
Crash 0.06729 0.08385 0.09319
Property Damage Only Crash 0.9551 0.9654 0.9777
Minor Injury from Crash 0.0220 0.0315 0.0409
Severe Injury from Crash 2.09E-04 2.99E-03 3.88E-03
Death from Crash 6.48E-05 9.26E-05 1.20E-04
aAll costs have been rounded to the nearest 2016 dollar
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States. The driver was randomized to either pilot a HPV
or AV. At each time step for either vehicle, the subjects
could be in one of several states: driving, driving severely
injured, dead, out of the analytic horizon and healthy, or
out of the analytic horizon and severely injured. The
analytic horizon was defined as the lifespan of a repre-
sentative vehicle, taken from a vehicle lifetable, and an
AV was assumed to have an equivalent lifespan to that
of an HPV (Table 1). It was important to continue to
run the model after the analytic horizon was reached, so
as to accurately calculate the impact on total QALYs of
each strategy past the lifespan of the car. While driving
or driving severely injured, a subject accrued the costs of
purchasing a vehicle (only on the first timestep), the cost
of owning and operating a vehicle, the cost of parking,
and the productivity loss from piloting a vehicle ($0 for
AV) (Table 2). For models involving taxis, the salary of
the taxi driver and other costs were included. Both the
expiration of the car (i.e., the end of the analytic
horizon) and the probability of a crash were drawn from
uniform random variables, as in a Monte Carlo model,
and compared to a lifetable for each timestep. The cost
of vehicle maintenance and upkeep for an AV was equal
to the cost of maintenance for a HPV plus the relative
marginal cost of an AV relative to an HPV—i.e., the cost
was scaled to account for the relative difference in
vehicle cost. For each timestep, a subject could be
involved in a crash with a fixed probability. The crash
type was determined using national statistics of the fre-
quency of crashes of each MAIS type, where an of MAIS
0, 1, and 2 was considered a minor injury crash, an
MAIS of 3, 4, or 5 was considered a severe injury crash,
and a fatal crash and property damage only crash were
considered in their own crash categories. If an individual
was involved in a fatal crash, they would be sent to the
“Dead” category for subsequent time steps, while if an
individual was involved in a severe injury crash, they
would be sent to the “Driving Severely Injured” category.
Individuals could also be sent to the “Dead” category
based on a lifetable checked each year given the subject’s
age. At the conclusion of the model (T = 100 timesteps),
all vehicles were expired and all individuals were dead;
the QALYs and costs for each iteration (N = 10,000)
were calculated and compared within iterations and
across the entire simulation.
The decision trees for each model can be found in the
Additional file 1.
Sensitivity and scenario analyses
We first conducted an analysis for the base-case sce-
nario, defined by the input values in Table 2. Sensitivity
analyses were then conducted using plausible ranges of
high and low values for each variable to test their
influence on the results of the model using the range of
values in Table 2. Values for several variables of interest
were simultaneously varied over their plausible range
using Monte Carlo microsimulations (N = 10,000
microsimulations), with values drawn from probabilis-
tically weighted triangular distributions or from
reported heterogeneous distributions, with linear
interpolation. Because NHTSA does not publish a
standard willingness-to-pay (WTP) threshold, we used
the EPA’s WTP threshold of $140,000/QALY (Muennig
and Bounthavong 2016). The results of this threshold
analysis are reported below.
Results
Simulation of human-piloted car cohort
The model replicated the U.S. cohort of conventional
car drivers between 2013 and 2016 and the U.S. cohort
of conventional taxis. Over the lifetime of the average
car, HPVs cost about $286,000 including the cost of the
vehicle, maintenance, parking, and other costs. The
average number of QALYs that the driver lives is 16.43.
Projected outcomes for the adoption of autonomous
vehicles
Quality-adjusted life years
Data from Waymo indicate the relative risk (RR) of
crashes for AVs is 1.30, while the RR for fatalities based
upon the vehicle’s speed at the time of the crash is 0.02
(Table 1) due to a much lower speed of impact with any
collisions.
AVs were projected to be safer than HPVs, with an
incremental increase in QALYs of 0.08 (0.05% change),
or approximately one month of perfect health, over the
time that the car is on the road.
Costs
The vehicle lifetime costs of purchasing, maintaining, and
operating new AVs ($425,757, 95% CI: $288,479–$594,010)
were projected to exceed costs for HPVs over the same
period by 49%, with most of the costs attributed to the
initial cost of an AV. The lifetime costs of purchasing,
maintaining, and operating a new AV with costs reduced
by 5-year Moore’s Law projection ($303,535, 95% CI:
$173,959–$613,812) still exceed the costs for HPVs by 6%.
The projected lifetime cost of using AV taxis ($447,667,
95% CI: $306,002–$634,870) in place of HPVs was found to
be 56% more expensive than owning and operating a pri-
vate HPV for the same period. The difference in costs is
primarily due to profits for the taxi owner. The projected
lifetime societal cost of using a human-piloted taxi
($570,032, 95% CI: $222,787–$1,205,646) was 34% higher
than those for using an AV taxi over the same period. Since
both vehicles have similar parking requirements, the differ-
ence was primarily due to the salary of the human driver.
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Cost-effectiveness
The adoption of AVs for private use was associated with
an ICER of $1,396,110/QALY gained (Table 3). Likewise,
the projected adoption of AVs in 5-years was $173,890/
QALY gained. The scenario comparing current HPVs to
AV taxis was associated with an ICER of $1,615,210/
QALY gained. The strategy of using human-piloted taxis
as an alternative to AVs was found to save both money
and QALYs.
Cost-effectiveness estimates were remarkably stable for
all scenarios and variables, with two notable exceptions.
The model comparing HPVs to a 5-year projection of
AVs was sensitive both to variation in the cost of an AV
or AV taxi and to variation in the probability of crash in
an AV or AV taxi.
Discussion
While the data are poor, and there is considerable uncer-
tainty, we find that the widespread adoption of AVs
could plausibly save lives, reduce suffering, and produce
improvements in productivity (due to fewer injuries), in
the short-term. However, it is unlikely that such vehicles
will find much of a market for personal use in private
sector in the near-term due to their high cost of owner-
ship and the impracticality of limiting the vehicles to
roads on which they have been programmed to operate.
This is true even when additional cost savings are con-
sidered, such as the economic benefits associated with
reductions in parking spaces.
However, we find that AVs would save money if used
as a taxi, even in their current state of development.
Both companies and families might be incentivized to
invest in an AV were one available on the market. Such
a vehicle could be rented out for additional income as a
ride share, rather than depreciating in value in the gar-
age. This could effectively incentivize fairly widespread
adoption of this technology, dramatically reduce the cost
of ride sharing, and remove jobs. For this reason, legisla-
tors should consider studying the regulation of AVs with
more urgency. If a commercially viable product ends up
on the road, the widespread adoption of AVs could come
sooner than anticipated even if its market price is too
high for most families to afford as a personal vehicle.
For this reason, policies that mitigate the potential
harms of AVs—and particularly the widespread and
rapid use of AVs as taxis, should be studied with more
urgency.
Many have speculated about the potential harms and
benefits of AVs on the road. If adopted today, AV taxis
would likely make it easier to transport people with
minor disabilities and would also lower costs for taxi
trips. This way, AV taxis produce large benefits for the
small segment of the population that regularly relies on
taxis or disabled transit services. However, it could also
expand the number of people who opt to ride share
rather than own a personal vehicle.
When used as taxis, AVs could, in the long-term, also
plausibly produce more land in cities for real estate,
sidewalks, bike lanes, emergency vehicle lanes, and
parks. This is because they continuously drive, shuttling
people around, and rarely needing to park. By decreasing
cars owned for personal use, they could eventually
eliminate office and shopping mall parking spaces, as
well as parking spaces provided by cities. By reducing
congestion and increasing drop off space, AVs could
reduce transport times of goods, increasing economic effi-
ciency at the macro level. Driver costs consume upwards
of 30% of trucking costs (European Parlament 2015).
While this brings huge economic efficiencies for
corporations, it can produce large shifts in the labor
force. These include the rapid displacement of taxi and
delivery drivers who might not be able to find jobs that
Table 3 The cost, quality-adjusted life years gained, and 95% confidence intervals (CIs), and incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICER)
from our microsimulation models (based on 10,000 microsumulations) for human piloted vehicles (HPVs) versus: privately-owned
autonomous vehicles (AVs), AVs 5 years in the future, and AV taxis. The final simulation compares human piloted taxis versus AV taxiss
Cost 95% CI QALYs 95% CI ICER
2.50% 97.50% 2.50% 97.50%
Human-Piloted Vehicles Versus AVs
HPVs 286,146 155,949 653,505 16.41 0.99 28.18
AVs 425,757 288,479 594,010 16.51 1.47 28.34 1,396,110
AVs in 5 Yearsa 303,535 173,959 613,182 16.51 1.47 28.34 173,890
AV Taxis 447,667 306,002 634,870 16.51 1.47 28.34 1,615,210
Human-Piloted Taxis Versus AV Taxis
HPT 570,032 222,787 1,205,646 16.41 0.99 28.18
AV Taxis 447,667 306,002 634,870 16.51 1.47 28.34 Saves money and QALYs
Incremental cost-effectiveness ratios in this analysis are only useful insofar as they inform consumers of the value of an AV relative to a conventional car on the
grounds of the best available health data. These data are subject to considerable uncertainty
aAVs were assumed to fall in price according to Moore’s Law, but were not assigned increased effectiveness
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pay as well. By providing taxi services at a lower price,
AV taxis could also move middle-income riders out of
urban public transportation systems, which too often
function on the edge of financial viability in the US.
(Many countries tend to have cheaper, more stable tran-
sit systems, however.)
Because they deliver passengers directly from one
destination to the next and because they displace public
transit, AV taxis could lead to less walking and higher
rates of obesity among some segments of the population,
while incentivizing others to take to the safer roads for
exercise.
Any of the above scenarios are mere speculation.
Without investments in research to study these potential
impacts of AVs, including regulatory policy experiments,
there will be no public debate or preparation for these
possibilities.
If the time horizon for a shift to AVs is a year to a few
years, as our study suggests it might be, action is needed
sooner rather than later. It is certainly difficult to study
whether AV taxis would reduce congestion and pollution
(by driving very close to one another and by optimizing
routes) or would increase it (by increasing demand for road
vehicles). However, legislation is best made on research ra-
ther than guesswork, and complex systems dynamics
models could inform such policymaking (Sterman 2006).
We also studied the cost-effectiveness of AV technology
in as a health investment because it is possible that some
families would be attracted to the safety of AVs relative to
conventional vehicles. At present, AV adoption in passen-
ger vehicles is significantly more expensive per QALY
gained than medical practices that are deemed unafford-
able (Boulware et al. 2003). It would be more than 5 years
before privately owned AVs reached the $140,000/QALY
gained threshold, which is considered a high valuation for
the willingness-to-pay for a QALY (Muennig and
Bounthavong 2016). As such, they are not a good value
even for households that can afford them for personal use,
nor are they likely to be in the near future.
Limitations
Our study has several limitations ranging from data un-
certainty in present terms to wide-ranging assumptions
about what the future might look like. We tested this
uncertainty and these assumptions using multiple one-
way sensitivity analyses and a Monte Carlo analysis,
which examines all sources of uncertainty together.
One of the biggest challenges in building our model was
estimating crash rates. Roughly, 47% of crashes among
HPVs go unreported (M. Davis and Co. 2015). This is
most likely because it is often less expensive for owners to
directly pay for minor automobile damages than to make
an insurance claim. On the other hand, our AV data con-
tain every incident, no matter how minor the crash. As a
result, it is difficult to know whether AVs actually cause
more or fewer minor crashes.
Waymo’s simulations based on billions of miles of
simulated driving predict that there would be only 68%
as many minor crashes if AVs completely replaced HPVs
today (and many fewer serious ones). We chose not to
rely on Waymo’s simulation data to estimate minor
crash rates because the data are not available for public
scrutiny. But if we did use this estimate, the projected
safety of AVs would be greatly increased, along with
their cost-effectiveness.
Second, the non-simulated data from Waymo that we
do use not only depends on reporting by the company
itself, but are also limited to just over 2 million miles of
actual road driving.
Finally, AV crashes may garner more attention than
HPV crashes (Boudette 2016). If adopted too early, the
crashes that they do cause may stir backlash, derailing
their use. Our models simply show that AVs could plaus-
ibly be used on the road today under ideal conditions.
One of the more obvious threats is that, with AV taxis on
the road, society could lose public transit systems. If so,
they pose threats to mobility for low-income Americans,
and those in major urban areas that are dependent on
public transit systems.
Conclusions
In the early 1900s, horse manure and corpses littered the
streets of major cities, posing a public health threat. When
the automobile was first introduced on US streets, it was
seen as a way of mitigating these public health threats, but
little attention was paid to the public health threats that
automobiles produced as unintended consequences. We
are now at the next frontier of transportation. However,
once again, Federal legislation is focusing on mitigating
the public health threats associated with human-powered
vehicles without attending to the threats that they pose.
Our study shows that autonomous taxis appear to be on
the threshold of viability from an economic and injury
prevention standpoint and may be introduced more
rapidly than some experts believe. There is an urgent need
for legislators to begin to focus on the unintended conse-
quences of AVs, including their impact on public trans-
portation and the built environment.
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